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Comments
FROM WARSAW TO TENERIFE:
A CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
LIABILITY LIMITATIONS IMPOSED PURSUANT
TO THE WARSAW CONVENTION
DAVID I. SHEINFELD*
INTRODUCTIONO N MARCH 27, 1977, the worst air disaster in aviation his-
tory took place.1 Intended as an alternate refueling point,
the tiny island of Tenerife in the Canary Islands was the site
where two jumbo Boeing 747's' collided, killing over 580 pas-
sengers.' Before the ruins of the two jumbo jets were removed
from the runway, lawsuits praying for enormous amounts of dam-
ages were in the preparatory stages." Speculation as to the amount
to be received by the victims varied depending upon the juris-
diction in which the lawsuit was brought.' Questions immediately
arose involving the role the Warsaw Convention! would play
* The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Mr. Richard
E. Gattis, Esq., practicing attorney in San Diego, California, member of the
State Bar of California, in the preparation of this paper.
'Los Angeles Times, Mar. 29, 1977, at 1, col. 5. For a chronological study
of the Tenerife disaster, see Spanish Government Report, Colison Aeronaves
Boeing 747 PH-BUF de K.L.M. y Boeing 747 N 737PA de PAN AM (March
27, 1977) (on file with CAL. W. INT'L L.J.).
The two jumbo jets involved in the Tenerife disaster were operated by Pan
American World Airways and the Royal Dutch Airlines, known as KLM.
' TIME, Oct. 30, 1978, at 58.
' Los Angeles Times, supra note 1, at 2, col. 5.
5 Id. In California, compensation for the loss of a young mother with chil-
dren generally ranges from $200,000 upwards. Jury verdicts for the loss of a
father depend primarily upon the age and income level of the passenger. Id.
" The Warsaw Convention, officially known as the Convention For the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934) [hereinafter cited as
Warsaw Convention], was proclaimed for the United States by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt on October 29, 1934. The Warsaw Convention was the result of
international conferences held in 1925 and 1929 which dealt with the problems
confronting the world's growing commercial aviation industry.
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in settling the claims of the 644 passenger claimants.7 Pursuant
to the terms of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent amend-
ments, liability was admitted by both air carriers involved,8 but
Pan Am and KLM waived the defense of the Warsaw Convention
as to the limitations on each passenger's recovery.9
Los Angeles Times, supra note 1, at 1, col. 5. At the time of the accident
the two carriers reported that there were 248 people on the KLM plane and 396
people on the Pan Am plane. Id.
' As can be shown by the standard air passenger ticket provisions, any accident
not caused by the passenger effectively binds the carrier to the extent of lia-
bility within the Warsaw Convention. If the passenger's journey involves an
ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure
the Warsaw Convention may be applicable, and the Convention governs and in
most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in re-
spect of loss of or damage to baggage.
ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL PASSENGERS ON
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a
stop in a country other than the country of origin are advised that
the provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Convention may
be applicable to the entire journey, including any portion entirely
within the country of origin or destination. For such passengers on
a journey to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United
States of America, the Convention and special contracts of carriage
embodied in applicable tariffs provide that the liability of certain
carriers, parties to such special contracts, for death of or personal
injury to passengers is limited in most cases to proven damages
not to exceed U. S. $75,000 per passenger, and that this liability
up to such limit shall not depend on negligence on the part of the
carrier. The limit of liability of U. S. $75,000 above is inclusive
of legal fees and costs except that in case of a claim brought in a
state where provision is made for separate award of legal fees and
costs, the limit shall be the sum of U. S. $58,000 exclusive of legal
fees and costs. For such passengers traveling by a carrier not a
party to such special contracts or on a journey not to, from, or
having an agreed stopping place in the United States of America,
liability of the carrier for death or personal injury to passengers is
limited in most cases to approximately U. S. $10,000 or U. S.
$20,000.
The names of carriers, parties to such special contracts, are avail-
able at all ticket offices of such carriers and may be examined on
request.
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing in-
surance from a private company. Such insurance is not affected by
any limitation of the carrier's liability under the Warsaw Conven-
tion or such special contracts of carriage. For further information
please consult your airline or insurance company representative.
8 In re Air Crash Disaster at Tenerife, Canary Islands, on March 27, 1977,
MDL Docket No. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). It was stated in the stipulation: "The
Warsaw Convention/Montreal Agreement limitations on recoverable compen-
satory damages shall not be asserted as a defense herein by KLM or Pan Ameri-
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Like most international air travelers, the Tenerife passengers
probably had only a limited awareness, of the international rules
governing limitations on recoveries. Few passengers realize what
the alternatives are for recovery should an accident occur. As a
result, the passenger relies upon the current state of international
aviation law to provide adequate compensation. The moment the
passenger is tendered the ticket and given a reasonable time to
read its provisions, the traveler is legally put on notice of the
carrier's limited liability." Under the conditions of Article 3 (1) (e)
and (2)1 of the Warsaw Convention, passengers are entitled to
be informed of the recoveries a carrier must provide. The ticket
acts as notification that this mode of transportation is subject to
the rules of liability established by the Warsaw Convention. Each
passenger is then afforded the opportunity to take additional steps
to protect against this limited liability. The passenger may pur-
can. All other defenses, except the defense of no liability for compensatory
damages, are reserved by KLM and Pan American."
"
0 See Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1965),
in which the court held that, under Article 3, note 3 of the Warsaw Convention,
"if the carrier 'accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been
delivered,' it shall not be entitled to the limitation of liability afforded by
Article 22(i)." See also Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), noted 44
J. AIR L. & COM. 175 (1978); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253 F. Supp.
237 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), afl'd, 390 U.S. 455, rehear-
ing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968).
" Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention states:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver
a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity,
and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have
the effect of depriving the transportation of its international char-
acter;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transporta-
tion, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this con-
vention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a
passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to
avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude
or limit his liability.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 3.
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chase additional flight insurance or separately contract with the
carrier for recovery limits contrary to those under the Warsaw
Convention."
The Warsaw Convention was originally enacted to place uniform
liability limits on all suits by international air passengers, but
changes in the laws of many countries significantly affected the
amount a potential claimant could recover. As the Warsaw Con-
vention grew older the inequities in its recovery limitations grew,
and subsequent amendments attempting to rectify the problem
quickly became outdated. Although attempts have been made to
modernize the liability limitations, the effectiveness of such at-
tempts cannot be ascertained when the original Warsaw Conven-
tion is identified as the starting point.
This uncertainty about the Warsaw Convention's liability limita-
tions continues to create havoc in the courts. The issue to be re-
solved in future international air claims, therefore, is whether the
liability limits set under the Warsaw agreement are subject to
broad interpretation by the courts.
In an effort to examine the inequities of passenger recovery
within the stipulations of the present Warsaw Convention, this
comment will chronologically analyze the following major events:
the original Warsaw Convention of 1929; the Hague Conference
of 1955; the Montreal Agreement of 1966; and the more recent,
but not yet ratified, international proposals. In discussing the de-
velopment of the recovery limitations of the Warsaw Convention,
it is necessary to identify the interplay between the interests in-
volved. Politics, economics, and the growth of the aviation industry
have been major factors in the effort to reach the most workable
solution for all concerned." Not only has this international process
12 See Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 857 (2d Cir. 1965),
in which a flight chartered by the United States government was involved in
transporting military personnel and cargo outside the continental limits of the
United States. An accident occurred in Japan, killing the plaintiff's son. The
decedent's ticket had been handed to him, after he had boarded the plane; thus
he had no opportunity to purchase additional flight insurance. The Second
Circuit found that "the delivery of the ticket was not adequate and that the
limitation on damages of the Convention is inapplicable." Id. at 856. Essentially,
the decedent was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to take any additional
measures against the stipulated liability limitation.
1 See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497 (1967). The authors of this article set forth
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of negotiation been tedious and long, " its results can be frustrating
to those passengers, air carriers, and attorneys who must deal
with its provisions on a regular basis. Even though the Warsaw
Convention is applicable each time a passenger sets out on an
international air journey, the adjudicative interpretation of the
liability limits is not fully understood by the many who must utilize
and apply it.'
I. THE ROAD TO LIABILITY LIMITS
A. The Original Warsaw Convention
With the commercial air transportation industry blossoming in
the 1920's, governments and industry alike began to inquire into
the ramifications of an aviation accident. Taking notice of this
concern, the French government in 1925 convened the First Inter-
national Conference of Private Air Law' primarily to consider
the creation of a uniform system of aviation law. Subsequently,
an excellent overview of the events leading up to the implementation of the
Warsaw Convention.
14 The Warsaw Convention was the product of an international conference
in Paris in 1925, the 1929 Warsaw Conference, and preliminary work done by
the interim Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens
(CITEJA). Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 498.
1" Legal writers in the field of international aviation law have acknowledged
the uncertain state of international liability limits. See Franck, International Law
in Canadian Practice: The State of the Art and the Art of the State, 31 INT'L J.
180, 197 (1976).
Other writers have discussed the problems inherent in the combining of com-
plex legal guidelines with complex factual patterns, a combination which occurs
in nearly every aviation case. In an effort to thoroughly examine each issue,
the standards used to interpret the law must be flexible, but this inevitably leads
to the application of law that is neither uniform nor consistent with previous
cases or appropriate statutory (treaty) provisions. See Campbell, Airlines' Re-
sponsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and Extensions, 43 J. AIR L. & CoM.
289, 322 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 134-138 infra. Progressing
through the development of the Warsaw Convention, it becomes readily apparent
that this international aviation treaty is providing much more than is being utilized
by the judicial system. Modernization has led the original Warsaw draft to
different interpretation although many of the interpreters appear uncomfortable
with this modernization. For example, in Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1089
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977), the court upheld the liability
limitation of the Montreal Agreement which was over ten years old. The court,
however, discussed the newly approved international liability limitation under the
Guatemala Protocol, stating that it would not utilize the new limitation because
any limit must be beneficial to the passenger. See note 99 infra.
"'See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 498.
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in 1929, the full conference was called to Warsaw to adopt what
is now known as the Warsaw Convention.'
The conference in Warsaw focused on two areas. First, it was
clear to the many member nations that commercial aviation travel
was expanding into many countries having different customs,
languages, social identities, and legal systems.18 These differences
necessitated the formation of a uniform international system to
deal with claims arising from international air accidents, without re-
gard to the destination of the flight. 9 The second goal at Warsaw
was to limit the potential liability the carrier would sustain should
an accident occur." The delegates debated extensively in attempt-
ing to arrive at a limit which was fair both to the victims and the
carier. It was finally agreed that the carrier's liability for personal
injury or property damage suffered by passengers on a flight or
while disembarking or embarking would be limited to 125,000
"Poincare francs," approximately 8,300 United States dollars.'
Beyond the two stated objectives for the Warsaw Convention,
the delegates present had one overriding goal in mind: uniformity
for all aspects of international commercial aviation." In time, with
extensive application and interpretation of the Convention, it be-
came apparent that the delegates had failed to accomplish this
primary purpose. As is the case with many treaties that must be
applied in ever-changing conditions, problems resulted from many
17 See note 10 supra, for an explanation of the Warsaw Convention as in-
terpreted by the courts.
is Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 498; see generally C. SHAw-
CROSS & K. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW (2d ed. 1951).
"9 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 498.
"Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, arts. 17, 22. Extensive discussion was
centered on the limit of liability a carrier would incur. The initial limit appears
to have been the result of a compromise considering the presumption of lia-
bility every carrier was to withstand under Article 17. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 13, at 499.
"1 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 499. Throughout this comment,
direct reference to liability amounts will be made in terms of the United States
dollar. Liability amounts were expressed in "Poincare francs," probably because
the original Warsaw Convention was formulated in France.
" International commercial aviation means the carriage by aircraft of persons
or property as a common carrier for compensation or hire between a place in
the United States and any place outside thereof; whether such commerce moves
wholly by aircraft or partly by aircraft and partly by other forms of trans-
portation. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. S 1301(23) (c) (Supp.
1979).
COMMENTS
different and contradictory interpretations by the courts.' In addi-
tion, many developed and industrial countries began to question
the reasonableness of the liability limit.' They raised three main
objections: (1) liability insurance could be obtained by the carrier
at a lower cost per passenger mile than originally had been thought,
because of the increased ability of the carriers to provide safer
transportation; (2) liability insurance costs were now shown to
be a minimal part of the carriers' operating costs, and; (3) the
initial protection afforded to the industry was now too extensive
due to the experience and knowledge of the carriers and their
vastly improved safety record."
Countries whose personal injury damage awards were not high
countered the developing countries' position by pointing out that
the limit of liability is dependent upon the value of an ounce of
gold in relation to the value of the Poincare franc at a particular
time."6 Thus, many countries viewed the limitation of liability
under Article 17 as no limitation at all, since the recovery limita-
tion would rise should a worldwide gold devaluation occur."'
B. The Hague Conference
Dissatisfaction with the Convention remained until 1955 when
the Hague Conference '8 was convened by the legal committee of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)." Prior to
the Conference numerous preliminary conferences had met to
discuss what was to result at the Hague in an increase in liability
limits. On the first day of the Hague Conference the United States
proposed an increase in the limit of liability to approximately
"See Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977). C.f. Block
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967).
24 The contents of these arguments are set out in ICAO LEGAL COMMITTEE,
REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION, ICAO INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE Am LAW, The Hague, Sept. 1955, vol. 2, at 93-100,
ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 (1956).
2 Id. at 96-97.
26 Id.
27/d.
28 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929,
The Hague, ICAO Doc. 7632 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Hague Protocol].
29 Calkins, Grand Canyon, Warsaw and The Hague Protocol, 23 J. AIR L. &
COM. 253, 256-57 (1956).
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25,000 United States dollars. In response to this figure, many of
the delegations introduced the Rio draft' proposing that the limit
of liability be set at approximately 13,300 United States dollars."
After much deliberation on the matter, a limit of approximately
16,600 United States dollars was adopted as the new ceiling of
recovery." Even with the new limit, however, the real increase
was greatly affected by the changed economic circumstances from
1929 to 1955. Since attorneys' fees, inflation, and the increased
cost of living would absorb a significant part of this added amount,
it was argued that the sum actually received by the passenger
would be much less than the authorized $16,600 recovery.' The
conflict between member nations over liability limitations ended
with a new effective recovery practically identical to the original
limit.
With the completion and signing of the Hague Protocol amend-
ment to the Warsaw Convention, problems developed in applying
the amendment to an already existing treaty. Numerous countries,
primarily those opposed to the Protocol, began to question the
validity of setting liability limitations. Does the amended treaty
still maintain its original purpose? Will it meet the needs of both
the victims and carriers should an international air accident
occur? Here again arose Warsaw's previous liability disputes.
By the time the Hague Conference was meeting, the interna-
tional commercial aviation community had taken a giant leap to-
ward economic stability.' No longer was there a need to protect
"See ICAO LEGAL COMMITrEE, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION, ICAO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE Am LAW, The
Hague, Sept. 1955, vol. 2, at 76, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 (1956).
3' Id. at 79.
'On September 28, 1955, the Hague Protocol was adopted by a vote of
22 to 14. It is interesting to note the voting patterns of the governments of
five major international air carrier nations. While the United States and most
of the other major aviation nations voted in favor of the Hague Protocol, Great
Britain and Italy abstained, and Spain and Japan viewed the need for the addi-
tion to the Warsaw Convention as unsubstantiated. The differences centered
on allowing each court the discretion to award court costs and expenses incurred
by the plaintiff only if the damages exceeded that amount for which the carrier
had offered to settle the matter. Id. at 509.
"ICAO LEGAL COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION, ICAO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAw, The
Hague, Sept. 1955, vol. 2, at 93, ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 (1956).
1 The tremendous growth experienced by the aviation industry was only then
coming into the public awareness. During testimony before the Senate Foreign
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the carrersi' financial position. International air transport had
blossomed into a multi-billion dollar industry. '
The proposed liability limitation in the Hague Protocol received
a cool reception in the United States. ' The Americans and other
opponents of the Protocol limit began to question the legality of
imposing any liability limitation on an industry that had compiled
such an impressive safety sheet. As a majority of all international
aviation carriers and passengers were from the United States,
American support was necessary if any new amendment to the
Warsaw Convention was to be effective. With talk of United
States denunciation"7 filtering the halls of the Conference, the fear
of a nonexistent Warsaw Convention, especially in the United
States, became a real possibility.' Nevertheless, the American dele-
Relations Committee, it was determined that international carriers, such as Pan
American World Airways and Trans World Airlines, had experienced enormous
growth from 1929 through 1964. This point, as well as others dealing with the
assertion of economic stability in the aviation industry, was cited in Hearings
on the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
1965 Senate Hearings].
SId.
36 Many of the arguments, both in favor of the Hague Protocol and in
opposition, were brought forth in hearings before the Air Coordinating Committee
(ACC) which was charged under an executive order to review all pertinent
information and to submit its recommendation to the executive and legislative
branches for or against ratification of the Hague Protocol. See 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 34, at 14-38.
3 The "denunciation" procedure is explained by the State Department in
Press Release No. 268, Nov. 15, 1965, 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923, 924 (1965).
Under Article 39 of the Warsaw Convention, each member country may de-
nounce the Convention upon six months notice. This press release announced
that the United States gave notice of denunciation of the Convention on No-
vember 15, to become effective May 15, 1966, unless prior to the effective date
there was a reasonable prospect of an international agreement to protect inter-
national air passengers.
"Setting the stage for what was to come, Rep. Lester Wolff strongly de-
nounced the limit proposed by the Hague Protocol. Analogizing the proposed
limit to fraud, he elaborated on the inequities of the liability limits:
The Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol are so unpalatable
that the State Department, which is pushing for ratification of
Hague, has decided to give us a bit of honey... . The treaty pro-
vides for uniformity. That is ridiculous. Uniformity can and is
secured by other means. First of all a majority of the countries of
the world belong to IATA, in fact, IATA is employed to set the
rates for all the airlines. If need be, we can keep the Warsaw Con-
vention and just exclude the liability limits. . . . For this reason, I
am asking the House of Representatives to set a precedent, a reso-
lution to express the sense of Congress that the United States
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gation to the convention recommended that the United States sign
the Protocol.
Prior to approval of the Protocol in the United States Senate,
the agency charged with reviewing such matters, the Air Coordi-
nating Committee (ACC), held hearings and submitted its find-
ings." Even though it recommended submitting the Protocol to
the Senate for its advice and consent, the ACC report questioned
several points. First, the Committee noted that the Hague Protocol
limit of recovery, although twice the amount allowed under the
original Warsaw Agreement, closely complied with the average
recovery obtained in non-Warsaw cases." Secondly, the report
addressed itself to the inadequacy of notice on the air carrier
ticket." Under the provisions of Article 3(1) (c) of the Hague
Protocol it was clear that each country could regulate its own
notice requirement.' The third question involved whether the
should not ratify a treaty, specifically the Hague Protocol. I also
ask that we be released from the Warsaw Convention with respect
to its liability limits.
89 CONG. REC. 20375-76 (1965) (remarks of Rep. Wolff).
11 These reports appear in the Report of the Air Coordinating Committee
transmitted by the President to the Senate for ratification. SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMM., MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE PROTOCOL, S. EXEC. Doc. No. H, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 18 [hereinafter cited as ACC REPORT]. See also Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 510.
40 What the ACC failed to consider was the difference between the average
recovery in non-Warsaw settlements as compared to a set limit. In 1959, the
average recovery for a Warsaw fatality was $7,654 while under the non-Warsaw
classification the average recovery per fatality was $79,857. Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 13, at 554.
"' See ACC REPORT, supra note 39, at 24. See also Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (ticket provision ruling).
'Article 3(1)(c) of the Hague Protocol, supra note 28, reads as follows:
1. In respcct of the carriage of passengers a ticket shall be
delivered containing:
(a) an indication of the places of departure and destination;
(b) if the places of departure and destination are within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, one or more agreed
stopping places being within the territory of another State, an indi-
cation of at least one such stopping place;
(c) a notice to the effect that, if the passenger's journey involves
an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country
of departure, the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that
the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of
carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or
damage to baggage.
See also ACC REPORT, supra note 39, at 25.
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Protocol would be applicable within the United States.' The ACC
report did not say that United States ratification should be con-
ditional upon the Protocol being applicable within the United
States." Originally intended as a uniform international system of
rules and regulations, the Hague Protocol appeared to be heading
in the opposite direction.
While considering the Hague Protocol for ratification, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee was exposed to two divergent views.
Witnesses representing the United States government favored the
acceptance of the Hague Protocol combined with insurance legis-
lation which would require United States certified carriers to pro-
cure up to $50,000 accident insurance.' The Air Transport Asso-
ciation (ATA), however, representing the air carriers, proposed
the acceptance of the Protocol without the insurance legislation.'
Although a compromise was reached between the administration
and the carriers eliminating the insurance requirement while com-
pelling each carrier to waive liability limits up to $50,000 per
passenger, it was evident that the United States Senate was mov-
ing toward disapproval of the Protocol as drafted.
The Hague Protocol, which arose primarily from the public
indignation surrounding two landmark cases, ' was distinctly out-
dated in terms of a fair liability limitation by the time it reached
the United States Senate for consideration. The talk throughout
the legislative halls was directed toward either a $100,000 lia-
4 3 ACC REPORT, supra note 39, at 25.
44 id.
4See 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 88-89, 99.
4Id. at 53.
"As of August 9, 1978, there were approximately 90 governments partici-
pating in the Hague Protocol. Although the United States was one of the
signatories of the agreement in principle, continued conflicts stalled the Hague
package in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Address by Hon. James
R. Atwood, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Remarks to the Air Transporta-
tion Subcommittee, International Law Section, American Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Aug. 9, 1978) (unpublished).
41Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). This action was originally commenced by
Ellen Jane Ross, known by her professional name of Jane Froman, for damages
as a result of injuries sustained when the plane crash-landed near Lisbon,
Portugal. Although the amount of damages recoverable was limited, the court
went to great lengths to apply that limit to the plaintiff's notice on the ticket.
88 N.E.2d at 882-86.
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bility limit '9 or denunciation. Faced with mounting pressure from
Congress and constant disagreement between State Department
officials and the ATA, each political party developed its respec-
tive position.' By the summer of 1965, it appeared that Congress
would not be able to act on the insurance legislation? There-
after, the administration concluded that the Hague Protocol alone
"would not afford adequate protection to the American traveling
public. If no supplementary protection could be made available,
then withdrawal from the Convention and reliance on the common
law would afford the best measure of protection."'" Within a week,
the five major United States international air carriers returned
with a decision rejecting the $100,000 liability limit, while concur-
rently showing signs of possible cooperation at the $50,000 level."
With Congress preparing to adjourn amidst disagreement between
federal regulatory agencies, time became a very important factor.'
Cognizant of the discontent surrounding the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, the United States government gave notice
of denunciation of the Convention on November 15, 1965, to
become effective May 15, 1966." It was emphasized that such ac-
tion was solely the result of the Convention's low limits of lia-
bility for personal injury or death to passengers.'
The United States was prepared to withdraw its notice of de-
nunciation should all the international carriers agree to an interim
49 See FLIGHT INT'L, Sept. 1965, at 538.
50 Id.
51 Having conditioned Senate ratification of the Hague Protocol upon the
agreement on a system of automatic compulsory trip insurance valued at $50,000,
the outlook for passage of the insurance legislation was not good. The State
Department was told by the chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that if an alternate program
to the insurance was not submitted, the Hague Protocol would stand no chance
of ratification. Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 291, 300 (1965).
12 Dep't of State, United States Government Action Concerning The Warsaw
Convention, May 5, 1966, reprinted in 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243, 244 (1966);
See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 546-47.
53 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 547.
4 Id.
I See note 37 supra. For a full explanation of the denunciation and the
reasons surrounding it, see CAB Agreement 18900 approved by CAB Order No.
E-23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
-M31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
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arrangement to waive liability limits up to $75,000 per passenger.'
As the consistent trend of disagreement over the Warsaw Con-
vention continued into the ICAO interim conference in Montreal
on October 26, 1965, it became apparent that preliminary steps
toward denunciation by the United States were destined to become
finalized."
C. The Montreal Agreement
As the 1965 Christmas tourist season approached, no interim
agreement had been reached and the United States began to pre-
pare for the ICAO conference to be held in Montreal' in February,
1966. The clear purpose of the Montreal Conference was to de-
termine a liability limit that would lead to cooperation within the
international aviation community.' At this conference the United
States delegation was fully equipped with economic statistics and
solutions to support its views on liability limitations. 1 Argument
and discussion continued over the course of several weeks on the
limit of liability that carriers should be required to waive. In de-
veloping its position on recovery limits, the United States govern-
ment considered the doctrine of absolute liability to the carrier to
offset any increased costs a passenger would incur in attempting
to prove liability. The United States was previously opposed to
absolute liability" "since the theory is unjust to the aircraft opera-
tor in requiring it to respond to damages regardless of fault."'
Nevertheless, in developing a position that would be acceptable
to the fifty-nine nations assembled, the legal arm of the Inter-
agency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) began to sen-
5 53 DEP'T STATE BULL., supra note 37, at 923.
8Id.
5' All reports, minutes, and documents of the ICAO Montreal conference are
reprinted in the SPECIAL ICAO MEETING ON LIMITS FOR PASSENGERS UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL, MONTREAL ICAO Doc. 8584-
LC/154-1, 154-2 (1966). For a general overview of the conference other than
liability limits, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 552-96.
°ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1, 154-2, supra note 59.
61 Cooperating with the Department of State and the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, the Civil Aeronautics Board compiled statistics from 1958 through
1964 listing all aircraft accidents and the amount of recovery, whether by judg-
ment or settlemnet. ACC REPORT, supra note 39; see also Lowenfeld & Mendel-
sohn, supra note 13, at 553.
"
2 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 558.
63 Id.
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ously contemplate the implementation of absolute liability. While
reaffirming the goal of attaining maximum recovery for passenger
victims, the IGIA outlined two reasons for advocating absolute
liability:
(1) By 1965, it was assumed that commercial aviation was no
longer an ultrahazardous enterprise. The aviation industry was
adapting itself to serve all facets of society,' and; (2) Between all
the parties involved in an accident, the airline is the party who is in
the best position to allocate the risk, either by insurance or by
loss distribution, so as to involve the least hardship."
The presence of these modem conditions was looked upon as
altering the meanings of original Warsaw Articles 17" and 21,'
and as compelling the contracting parties to waive the Article 20"
defense. The purpose of Article 20 was to enable an aviation car-
rier to exonerate its actions from liability by showing that it had
taken "all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
" See Note, Liability For Aircraft Damage to Ground Occupiers-A Study of
Current Trends in Tort Law, 31 IND. L.J. 63 (1955). It was found that due to
the technological advancements made in the industry and to the commendable
safety records compiled since World War II, the aviation industry can no
longer be classified as ultrahazardous. This being the case, a basis for the lia-
bility conditioned upon the safeness of the carrier is no longer needed. Id. at 64.
" Id. at 69-71.
6 Under the original provisions of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, it
was stipulated that, "The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained . . ."
(emphasis added), whereas under the Hague Protocol revision, Article 17 reads
as follows:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event
which caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disem-
barking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury
resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.
Hague Protocol, supra note 28, art. 17 (emphasis added).
6Article 21 of the Warsaw Convention reads as follows: "If the carrier
proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of
the injured person the court may in accordance with the provisions of its own
law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 6, art. 21. See Sincoff, Absolute Liability and Increased Damages
in International Aviation Accidents, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 147, 151 (1967).
68 Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Hague Proto-
col reads as follows: "The carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures." Warsaw Convention, supra
note 6, art. 20(1).
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impossible for him or them to take such measures. '"" In addition
to showing that it took all necessary measures, the carrier must
show that it was logically impossible that an accident would occur
after taking all necessary measures to avoid the damage. °
Ultimately, the real issue was a permanent determination of
liability limits. Realizing that the Montreal Conference was only
temporary, the representatives assumed that an international con-
ference would be convened immediately following adoption of
the interim agreement in order to consider permanent revisions
to the Warsaw Convention.71 Conflicts arose among the repre-
sentatives to the conference with respect to four separate pro-
posals on liability limits."2 When no proposal received a decisive
vote, the conference closed without reaching an interim agreement.
Soon thereafter, the president of the ICAO council began to dis-
cuss with the delegates the $75,000 interim recovery limit proposed
by the United States and its co-signers."8 The concept of absolute
liability was proposed along with a three-point plan. First, the
United States proposal called for notification of an interim arrange-
69Id.
70 The revisions to Articles 17, 21, and 20 raise questions regarding language
which fundamentally overlaps. Although a carrier is presumed to be liable under
Article 17 and its ability to raise defenses under Article 20 is essentially waived,
there is no provision explaining to what degree, if any, willful misconduct by
the passenger would apply. For case law dealing with the burden of proof an
air carrier must carry, see Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines,
Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966), and
Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1965).
71 See Sincoff, supra note 67, at 153.
7 The four principal proposals on liability limitations introduced at the
Montreal conference and the final votes on each were as follows:
Czech Proposal 22 for, 11 against, 11
($33,200 under Warsaw-Hague) abstentions
French Proposal 32 for, 7 against, 7
($50,000 under Warsaw-Hague) abstentions
Irish Proposal 25 for, 8 against, 12
($50,000/66,000) abstentions




See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, .at 574.
1 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Interna-
tional Air Transportation Association (IATA) were expected to thoroughly
examine the United States interim plan as it was their duty and obligation to
the other international aviation members to do so.
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ment, involving the $75,000 limit and absolute liability, to be
made to all United States carriers traveling internationally. If
acceptable to the carriers, the second point called for consulta-
tions and meetings with members of Congress. After a successful
completion of these first two steps, the proposal would then be
tested through various international agencies.'
Again, as in the past, conflicts arose regarding the issue of
absolute liability. The ATA answered the proposed interim arrange-
ment by approving the $75,000 limit, but conditioning such sup-
port on a commitment by the United States to push for ratification
of the Hague Protocol.'
Racing against a deadline set by the United States for accept-
ance of the proposed recovery limit," the IATA reported that
twenty-five of its member carriers were prepared to accept the
arrangement as detailed in the three-point plan. Subsequently,
on May 16, 1966, an agreement was reached between the various
air carriers, both foreign and domestic, increasing the liability
limit to $75,000 for all "international transportation.'' The
interim agreement did not delete or supersede Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention; therefore, unlimited damages were still per-
mitted to a plaintiff who could prove willful misconduct.'
74 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 588.
r7 Id. at 588 n.298.
76 Recognizing the benefits accorded by an interim agreement which included
the $75,000 limit with absolute liability, the United States government extended
the period of initiation by the IATA to May 1, 1966. Although either denuncia-
tion of the agreement or acceptance of the $75,000 limit was acceptable to the
United States, numerous international airlines began to fear the possibility of
unlimited recoveries should denunciation of the Warsaw Convention occur. Lowen-
feld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 590.
7 See ticket provisions, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
71 Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention reads as follows:
Carrier's willful misconduct or defaults
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the pro-
visions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if
the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default
on his part as, in accordance with the law of the Court to which
the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful
misconduct.
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circum-
stances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 25.
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It is essential to determine upon what legal foundation, if any,
this new interim agreement stands. Article 22(1) of the Warsaw
Convention states: "Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." At
first glance it would appear that a contract supersedes an interna-
tional treaty. The Montreal Agreement, unlike the original War-
saw Convention and the Hague Protocol, is a "special contract"
in accordance with Article 22(1)." Proper tendering of a ticket
combined with reasonable notice of its contents will bind a passen-
ger to its stipulated terms."0 This Agreement includes three essential
provisions: (i) recovery for death or bodily injury shall not exceed
$75,000 including all legal fees and costs; (ii) the carrier must
furnish a ticket detailing notice of the liability limitation of the
Warsaw Convention, the Hague Protocol, and the Montreal Con-
ference; and (iii) the defense under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw
Convention will no longer be available to the carrier.' Here, a
question arises as to the legality of a contract when there has been
no formal severance of the coverage under the original Warsaw
Convention. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, two of the leading
scholars in aviation law, conclude:
Since the agreement is expressly stated to be a special contract
under Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention, it incorporates
all the other provisions of the Convention .... Article 23 of the
Convention must be understood as if it read, 'Any provision
(statutory or contractual) tending to relieve the carrier of liability
or to fix a lower limit than that which is laid down in the agree-
ment among carriers shall be null and void.'
Despite such views, the controversies which surrounded the War-
saw Convention from its inception continued to impede the im-
plementation of the Montreal Agreement. Its standing as an
7 Article 22(1) reads as follows: "In the carriage of persons the liability of
the carrier for each passenger is limited to the sum of two hundred and fifty
thousand francs .... Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the pas-
senger may agree to a higher limit of liability." Hague Protocol, supra note 28,
at 7-8. The last count of international carriers that are parties to the Montreal
interim Agreement showed over 140 signatories. 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 455-57
(1966). See also CAB AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS 426-27
(rev. ed. 1970).
8 See ticket provisions, supra note 8, and accompanying text.
81 Id.
82 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 13, at 597.
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interim agreement left it open for attack from those parties who
thought that a set limit was not a true reflection of the recoveries
obtained in other accidents. Two distinct arguments were made
for the liability limit under the 1966 Montreal Agreement. Lowen-
feld and Mendelsohn expressed the view that the Montreal Agree-
ment furthers the best interests of the public and reinforces a
position the United States plans to take in preparation of a perma-
nent amendment:
Essentially, then, the success of the arrangement will depend on
the accuracy of the prediction that cases will be settled quickly
and economically. It may well be that in the case of principal
wage earners in the United States, claims will be handled like
health or life insurance claims-with forms and perhaps interviews
with the plaintiff and with the decedent's employer, but without
litigation. Where lawyers do participate, either to establish the
proper claimant or to participate in the determination of the
amount of damages, their task will be far simpler than at common
law. They will not be required to have expertise either in conflict
of laws or in the causes of air accidents, and with the issue of
fault laid aside, there will be no risk of nonrecovery. It would seem
fair to assume that in these circumstances the cost of lawyers'
services will be drastically reduced. "
Other individuals knowledgeable in the field of international
aviation law took different views. A majority of those who oppose
the Montreal Agreement recognized it as a restraint upon the
power of the judiciary and the traveling public to determine
justifiable recoveries in relation to each accident." Others opposed
any liability limitation that would benefit an industry able to bear
the burden of compens'ation:"
Compensation, by definition, should compensate. If a man is
badly injured, and his damages are great, the damages should be
tailormade to compensate for those great injuries. If a man has a
minor injury, the compensation should be small. Compensation
which gives too little, in my way of thinking, is not right, and
compensation which gives too much is not right.8"
The concept of appropriate compensation in my judgment is very
" Id. at 600-01.
"See Kreindler, Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33 J. Ant L. & COM. 528 (1967)
(covering the pros and cons of the Montreal interim Agreement).
IJd. at 531.
8 Id. at 529.
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close to the concept of the dignity of the individual. If you deprive
a man of his means to earn a livelihood, you should compensate
him for that. And so, when anyone or anything, be it an interna-
tional organization, or an outdated treaty, attempts to impose an
arbitrary or artificial limitation of any kind on this concept, there
is going to be a clash of ideology. And I do not think in this day
and age you will see any further ratification of limitations.87
Conflict among these well-respected experts ultimately led to
increased studies on the matter of aviation liability." The world
economy was changing much too rapidly for established limits to
be broadly applicable, and a difficult enforcement question was to
confront both the carriers and their respective licensors in the
courts: Was the Montreal Agreement to be interpreted as an
amended provision to the original Warsaw Convention or as a
separate agreement enforceable under basic contract principles?"
During the 1977 Senate hearings to consider further amendment
to the Warsaw Convention," it was found that, while the Warsaw
Convention with its subsequent amendments is the most widely
accepted private international law treaty in the transportation
field, it is also the most widely criticized. The existence of this
agreement in today's aviation community continues to allow an
international carte blanche on liability limitation.
II. RECENT TRENDS
The deficiencies of the Montreal interim Agreement, coupled
with a rapidly changing world economic order brought about
further attempts to amend the Warsaw Convention. Even as the
Montreal interim Agreement was announced, the United States
Department of State was advancing its position on a new amend-
ment to the Warsaw Convention." While a basic framework for
87 1d. at 531.
S8 CAB, RECOVERIES FOR DEATH AND PERSONAL INJURY RESULTING FROM
AIR TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS INVOLVING UNITED STATES CARRIERS 1950-1964, re-
printed in Stephen, The Montreal Conference and International Aviation Liability
Limitations, 33 J. AnR L. & CoM. 554, 590 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CAB
Studies 1950-1964].
', See notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
"Hearings on Aviation Protocols Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977
Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols].
1 See 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923, 924 (1965).
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uniform air carrier liability was developed at Montreal, further
conflict was inevitable.' The interests in favor of protecting the
international aviation industry could not deter proponents who
argued in favor of just compensation for a just cause of action."
Numerous studies, together with compilations of statistics focus-
ing on the levels of recoveries involving United States carriers,
heavily reinforced the $100,000 (1,500,000 Poincare francs) limit
proposed by the United States." With these statistics and numer-
ous policy arguments,9' it was apparent that the next major ICAO
conference, to be held in Guatemala City in 1971, would again
focus on the issue of amending the Warsaw Convention to in-
crease the recovery level to one acceptable to both the carriers
and potential beneficiaries. Following two unsuccessful attempts
to impose a $100,000 liability limit as a reasonable compensa-
tion," it seemed that any proposal incorporating a limit of less
than $100,000 would stand little chance of United States Senate
approval. 7
9 As the ICAO Guatemala Conference proceeded, the issue of a set recovery
limit began to overshadow all other issues, including passenger tickets, baggage
claims, and liability for delay in the carriage of passengers. Much of the time
allocation for discussion of the issues can be found in the records of the ICAO
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW, GUATEMALA CITY, ICAO Doc. 9040-
LC/167-1, 167-2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GUATEMALA PROCEEDINGS].
93 Id.
94See CAB Studies 1950-1964, supra note 88, at 590.
-' The United States supported its position with both statistics from the CAB
studies and the proposed establishment of an additional system to supplement the
results of the revised Convention. The increased American standard of living
led the United States delegation in Guatemala City to remark, "The magnitude
and rate of increase of the change (in passenger recovery levels) has led us to
believe that recoveries within the limit of liability specified in the proposed re-
visions would not alone afford sufficient protection of United States citizens
and therefore would not provide the basis for an enduring agreement." GUATE-
MALA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 92, at 43.
91 See ICAO MEETING ON LIMITS FOR PASSENGERS UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION AND HAGUE PROTOCOL, ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1, at 112 (1966).
With the United States facing a possible second defeat with the $100,000 lia-
bility limit, the ICAO Legal Committee recommended in 1967 that a subcom-
mittee be formed primarily concerned with the revision of the Warsaw Conven-
tion of 1929 as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955. Nonetheless, the United
States was again unsuccessful in attaining an agreement that $100,000 was a
reasonable compensation limit. For a full explanation of the events leading up
to this decision, see ICAO SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE LEGAL COMMITTEE ON THE
QUESTION OF REVISION OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AS AMENDED BY THE
HAGUE PROTOCOL, MONTREAL, ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as REVISION COMMITTEE].
"
7See REVISION COMMITTEE, note 96 supra.
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Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) studies for the period from
1966 to 1970 showed that the average settlement for a passenger
death in an accident not covered by the Warsaw Convention ex-
ceeded the $200,000 level.' Therefore, the previously proposed
$100,000 limitation was already outdated. The United States,
recognizing that the statistics and research supporting the $100,000
limitation were already obsolete, was forced to reevaluate and
reweigh its position regarding the proposed $100,000 recovery
level. In an effort to revise its position, while at the same time
to afford the passenger the maximum possible recovery, the United
States proposed to the Guatemala delegates a Supplemental Com-
pensation Plan (SCP) to be established by each nation over and
above the initial $100,000" recovery permitted. The conditions of
Article 35 A of the Guatemala Protocol, which implemented the
Supplemental Compensation Plan, can be interpreted as broaden-
ing the scope of liability. In other words, the establishment of a
limit of supplemental compensation would allow "any person suffer-
ing damage as a consequence of death or personal injury" of a
passenger contributing to a SCP to recover under the system.1"'
"' In an effort to verify its previous studies, (see CAB Studies 1950-1964, supra
note 88) the CAB presented a questionnaire to the United States air carriers
seeking information on approximately 180 accidents between 1966 and 1970.
The questionnaire requested that the carriers state the claims and the date of
settlement, whether through judgment or settlement. The results of this question-
naire were recorded in CAB, LEVEL OF RECOVERIES ON ACCOUNT OF PASSENGER
DEATHS AND SERIOUS INJURIES IN AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS (1970) (unpublished
report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, July 26, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as CAB STUDY 1970].
"Based on the price of an ounce of gold in today's market, the initial re-
covery limit of $100,000 set under the Guatemala conference would now be
worth well over $500,000.
100 Article 35 A states:
No provision contained in this convention shall prevent a State
from establishing and operating within its territory a system to
supplement the compensation payable to claimants under the Con-
vention in respect to death, or personal injury, of passengers. Such
a system shall fulfill the following conditions:
a) it shall not in any circumstances impose upon the carrier, his
servants or agents, any liability in addition to that provided under
this Convention;
b) it shall not impose upon the carrier any financial or adminis-
trative burden other than collecting in that State contributions from
passengers if required so to do;
c) it shall not give rise to any discrimination between carriers
with regard to the passengers concerned and the benefits available
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The United States delegation was prepared to labor diligently
to secure these revisions, intending to extract major concessions
from its aviation allies.' While there were many arguments against
the SCP idea, the supplemental plan included an increase in pas-
senger recovery substantially higher than would be the case with
no such plan." A tentative agreement was not reached, however,
until the seventeenth session of the ICAO Legal Committee. The
delegation from New Zealand presented a proposal incorporating
the minimum limits set by the United States as well as absolute
air carrier liability." In adopting this set liability of $100,000,
the Guatemala Conference also adopted the doctrine of absolute
liability and stipulated that the limit be made "unbreakable in all
circumstances."'" The delegates could probably foresee that this
$100,000 limit would soon need revision. Years of compiling
statistics on air crash recoveries might be inadequate to supply an
accurate report on amounts of damages. For this reason, the New
to said passengers under the system shall be extended to them
regardless of the carrier whose services they have used;
d) if a passenger has contributed to the system, any person
suffering damage as a consequence of death or personal injury of
such passenger shall be entitled to the benefits of the system.
GUATEMALA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 92, at 191. In essence, the scope of
liability has expanded under Article 35 A as compared to Article 17(1) through
its use of the words, "any person suffering damage as a consequence of death
or personal injury of such [a] passenger." Article 17(1) limits liability to "dam-
age[s] sustained."
101 Address by Hon. James R. Atwood, supra note 47.
" See 1977 Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols, supra note 90, at 43.
03 The original text of the New Zealand proposal was recorded by the ICAO
LEGAL COMMITTEE, 17TH SESS., MONTREAL, ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162, at 364
(1970). Essentially, the proposal included five main positions:
1) There would be absolute liability in the case of death or personal injury
to the passenger. Contributory negligence was the only defense a carrier could
invoke;
2) There would be an incrcase in liability for death or personal injury to the
passenger to $100,000;
3) There would be a provision adopted for the limit to be unbreakable in all
circumstances;
4) There would be an increase of approximately $2,500 per year for twelve
years while a diplomatic conference would convene during the fifth and tenth
years of the Protocol to decide whether to amend this provision or continue it;
and
5) A settlement inducement clause which would permit the allocation of
court costs and attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in addition to the compensation
awarded by the courts.
104 Id.
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Zealand Plan, as adopted, provided for conferences to reconsider
the liability limit to be convened during the fifth and tenth years
of the treaty with a maximum increase of approximately $12,500
per conference."
While this compromise plan was a major step forward, the ulti-
mate effectiveness of the Guatemala Protocol was to rest on two
final provisions. The first provision, introduced as Article D and
subsequently implemented into Article VIII,'" called for thirty
nations to ratify the Protocol. To assure adequate compliance with
the Protocol, it was further required that five of the thirty nations
account for at least forty percent of the total travel of ICAO
member nations."' Because the United States carriers comprised
approximately forty percent of the ICAO scheduled traffic,' the
Protocol's success was dependent upon United States acceptance
and ratification.'"
In an effort to invoke the uniformity so needed by the aviation
community, the second of the final clauses, known as Article H,
proposed a limitation on the reservations a nation may declare
I'Article 42(3) states:
(3) Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, unless before the thirty-
first of December of the fifth and tenth year after the date of entry
into force of the Protocol referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article
the aforesaid Conferences decide otherwise by a two-thirds majority
vote of the Parties present and voting, the limit of liability in
Article 22, paragraph 1 (a) in force at the respective dates of these
Conferences shall on those dates be increased by 12,500 Special
Drawing Rights.
GUATEMALA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 92, at 142.
100 Article XX states that as soon as thirty signatory states have deposited
their instruments of ratification of the Protocol, it shall come into force between
them on the ninetieth day after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratifi-
cation. It shall come into force for each state ratifying thereafter on the ninetieth
day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification. See final version in GUATE-
MALA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 92, vol. II, at 192.
107 See Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further Amend
the 1929 Warsaw Convention, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 519, 541 (1972).
'0o 1977 Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols, supra note 90, at 3.
'"A differentiation of the words "acceptance" and "ratification" is in order.
Although the Senate's express authority under the Constitution entitles that
legislative body to exercise its advice and consent power as a step towards treaty
ratification, the ratification is often misapprehended as an inherent right of the
United States Senate. The Constitution of the United States provides that
the President "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur ..
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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during the ratification procedure." At first glance, Article H
appears not to supersede the requirements proposed in the "New
Zealand Package"; however, an alternate interpretation may be
appropriate. Since the primary goal of the Guatemala Protocol
was to modify the Warsaw Convention articles dealing directly
or indirectly with the liability limitation,11' ratification of this Pro-
tocol would have no enforceable effect without a nation's com-
pliance with the original Warsaw Convention or the Hague Con-
vention.1 Essentially, the ratification of the Guatemala Protocol
by a member nation of the ICAO, coupled with the interpretation
of Article 27 that the Warsaw Convention, amended by the Hague
110 Article H to the Protocol was incorporated as Article XI. It states:
(1) Only the following reservations may be made to this Pro-
tocol:
a) any State whose courts are not authorized under its law to
award the costs of the action including lawyers' fees may at any
time by notification addressed to the Government of the Polish
People's Republic declare that Article 22, paragraph 3(a) shall not
apply to its courts;
b) any State may at any time declare by a notification addressed
to the Government of the Polish People's Republic that the Warsaw
Convention as amended at The Hague, 1955, at Guatemala City,
1971, and by the Additional Protocol No. 3 of Montreal, 1975,
shall not apply to the carriage of persons, baggage, and cargo for
its military authorities on aircraft, registered in that State, the whole
capacity of which has been reserved by or on behalf of such
authorities; and
c) any State may declare at the time of ratification or of acces-
sion to the Montreal Protocol No. 4 of 1975, or at any time there-
after, that it is not bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Conven-
tion as amended at The Hague, 1955, at Guatemala City, 1971,
and by the Additional Protocol No. 3 of Montreal, 1975, in so far
as they relate to the carriage of cargo, mail and postal packages.
Such declaration shall have effect ninety days after the date of
receipt by the Government of the Polish People's Republic of the
declaration.
(2) Any State having made a reservation in accordance with the
preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw such reservation by
notification to the Government of the Polish People's Republic.
GUATEMALA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 92, at 192.
" See note 92 supra, and accompanying text.
112 Ratification of the Guatemala Protocol under Article XIX provided:
[R]atification of this Protocol by any state which is not a party to
the Warsaw Convention or of any state which is not a party to
that Convention as amended at the Hague, 1955, shall have the
effect of accession to the Warsaw Convention as amended at the
Hague, 1955, and at Guatemala, 1971.
See Mankiewicz, supra note 107, at 542.
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Protocol of 1955, as a single agreement,'13 would eliminate any
possibility that a member nation could approve only a specific part
of the amended treaty. Because of this interpretation and the con-
tinued United States opposition to the concepts embodied in the
Hague Protocol, the United States Senate to this day has yet to
approve the Guatemala Protocol.'" Since the Guatemala Protocol
was essentially a United States initiative,"' many governments are
following the standard practice of treaty approval and are awaiting
United States ratification before making the same international
commitment."'
Subsequent to the agreement reached in Guatemala City in
1971, the innovative minds that directed this liability package
through the diplomatic gauntlet would be further frustrated as
they sought the resolution of another issue. World economic events
affecting currency value led to much speculation on the standard-
ized unit of payment: gold. With the role of gold in the interna-
tional monetary system greatly fluctuating,"' there was a need to
113 Id. It should be pointed out that although Article XIX interprets the three
agreements as one, their origination and application are separate.
"'The Diplomatic Conference held in Guatemala City under the auspices of
the International Civil Aviation Organization for the purpose of amending the
Warsaw Convention adopted the Protocol by a vote of 36 to 6. The Protocol
was signed on behalf of the following 22 states: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Rep.
of China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Fed.
Rep. of China, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Switzerland, Trini-
dad, Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela. INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, PROTOCOL REVISING WARSAW CONVENTION RULES
ON AIR CARRIER LIABILITY TO PASSENGERS, reprinted in 64 DEP'T STATE BULL.
661 (1971).
I" See 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923, 924 (1965); Address by James R. Atwood,
supra note 47, at 8.
:16 Address by James R. Atwood, supra note 47, at 8.
"7 The system of Special Drawing Rights (SDR) was ushered into the Inter-
national Monetary Fund after it was discovered that the diminishing value of
gold had caused a weakness in the foreign exchange market. Unlike any general
account, which is calculated through a quota derived from the value of gold
and the members' own currency, the SDR does not hold gold and currencies which
must be maintained in gold values. Accordingly, the delegation to the second
major Montreal Conference in 1975 urged the adoption of the SDR as the
standard to determine a uniform recovery limit. For a full text of the SDR system,
see Effros, Maintenance of Value in the General Account and Valuation of the
SDR in the Special Drawing Account of the IFM, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
493, 504 (1976). It is ironic to note that upon originally introducing the SDR
system to the delegations, the CAB emphatically rejected this IATA adoption;
however, during that same month at the Montreal Conference, the CAB was
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implement an alternative system for financial transactions within
the set liability limits.118 As a reform aimed at providing a less
erratic monetary standard, the 1975 ICAO conference meeting in
Montreal adopted the Standard Drawing Right119 (SDR) as the
basic monetary unit of the Warsaw Convention and its subsequent
agreements. 20
Although the 1975 Montreal Conference altered the monetary
system involving the limitation on recovery, the agreement was
essentially the same document adopted in 1971 at Guatemala
City. The new agreement, known as Montreal Protocol No. 3,11
provides for absolute liability, a settlement inducement clause,
an unbreakable limit of $100,000 SDR's (approximately 117,000
United States dollars), and the express right of each party to the
treaty to establish a Supplemental Compensation Plan within its
territories."'
The international aviation community has not as yet benefited
from the optional SCP clause to the Montreal Protocol No. 3.
Under the conditions outlined in the Montreal Protocol of 1975,
ratification may occur only when a supplemental system is en-
dorsed providing sufficient liability coverage to the United States
citizen. Thus, the international aviation community has had to
forestall ratification pending the approval of a sufficient SCP as
strongly urging adoption of the SDR system. Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 8,
1975, at 24.
118 Effros, supra note 117, at 504.
119 Id.
120 Id. Introduction of the SDR system to the limit set in Guatemala, see
GUATEMALA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 92, amended the $100,000 limit to approxi-
mately $117,000.
121 While the 1975 Montreal Conference was convened primarily for the pur-
pose of addressing the problems of air mail and cargo, numerous developments
during the early 1970's called for an immediate reevaluation of the recovery
limit set under the Guatemala Protocol. Detailed records explaining the pro-
ceedings and all pertinent documents can be found in ICAO INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON AIR LAW, ICAO Doc. 9154-LC/174-1, 174-2 (1975) [herein-
after cited as 1975 MONTREAL PROCEEDINGS]. Further, two events occurred in
1971 which appeared to shake the international monetary system, primarily in
regards to converting to the U.S. dollar. The first event occurred when the U.S.
reneged on its obligation to freely buy and sell official gold at $35 per ounce and
suspended the U.S. dollar convertibility into gold. The second event involved the
devaluation of the dollar by approximately 8% in relation to gold to $38 per
ounce. See Mendelsohn, The Value of the Poincare Gold Franc in Limitation of
Liability Conventions, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 125, 126 (1973).
'" See 1977 Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols, supra note 90, at 7.
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stipulated in Article 35 A of the Guatemala Protocol.'
The United States government has been determined to abide
by its longstanding policy that any loss resulting from an inter-
national aviation disaster must be sufficiently recoverable," ' but
faced with the dilemma of passenger compensation versus industry
stability, the government has been forced to set a limit which
clearly could be adhered to by all parties to the agreement. An
insurance underwriter capable of managing and carrying the supple-
mental compensation fund was needed. Numerous insurance under-
writers were examined, with the Prudential Insurance Company of
America faring the best.' It is hoped that the Supplemental Com-
pensation Plan, when formally approved, will establish a system
under which the insurer will cover the passenger up to $200,000
over the maximum liability standard of $117,000 (100,000
SDR's). With each passenger paying a surcharge or tariff of $2.50
per ticket, Prudential will set up a pool into which the carrier will
make monthly contributions collected from passengers flying the
international route. The applicability of this plan is contingent
upon three essential requirements: (1) the transportation is sub-
ject to the Warsaw Convention; (2) the person has his or her
domicile or permanent residence in the territory of the United
States; and (3) the Plan surcharge was or should have been col-
lected.'' Upon examination, two points must be noted regarding
these requirements. First, under the language of the third require-
ment, the additional $200,000 under the SCP would be tendered
to the injured passenger or his immediate family for wrongful
death not only if he paid the $2.50 surcharge, but also if he should
have paid it and the carrier failed to collect it."' Secondly, careful
"'See Address by James R. Atwood, supra note 47, at 8.
'1' See 1977 Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols, supra note 90, at 8
(statement of Herbert Hansell).
'25 Their plan called for using 93 % of the charges for payments to claimants,
direct claim expenses and additions to the fund. The balance would be used to
pay taxes, the administrative costs, and the risk charges. In addition, Prudential
is willing to share its underwriting with other companies so that the level of
charges may be kept to a minimum.
12 1977 Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols, supra note 90, at 59-61
(statement of Alan N. Ferrguson).
2 7 It should be noted that a situation similar to the one mentioned would
inevitably open the door for continued litigation on the issue of whether the
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examination of Article 35 A shows a dramatic conflict between
its intended use and subsequent application. Article 35 A states,
"No provision contained in this convention shall prevent a state
from establishing and operating within its territory a system to
supplement the compensation. . . ." ' This appears to focus on
the sufficiency of recovery;... only the specific amount necessary to
compensate the victim will be sufficient.3 ' The determination of a
sufficient recovery will depend upon the acceptance and verifica-
tion of government statistics showing that recovery under the War-
saw liability limitation is nearly equal to non-Warsaw recoveries. 3'
Previous statistics used to compile a standard recovery limit for
the Montreal interim Agreement were shown to be outdated the
day they were submitted."' Should the international air passenger
have to assume that the statistics used in arriving at this SCP
figure are accurate and truly reflect the amount of recovery due
the passenger? The United States Senate must make the final de-
cision whether these drawbacks inherent in the SCP are out-
weighed by the overall benefits to the United States air traveler
and carrier.
After many years of dealing with the primary issue of liability,
underwriter or the carrier bears the loss. Thus, the courts would continuously
have to address the question of intent.
'1 For text of Article 35 A, see note 100 supra.
12' During testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1977
Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols, supra note 90, at 88, Mr. Sodd stated
that "if we are to use domestic recoveries as a yardstick to measure the sufficiency
of recovery under the treaty, then there is no sufficient limit that we can establish
now that will not be exceeded in the next decade."
130 Responding in the area of adequate compensation, Mr. Lee S. Kreindler's
testimony revealed the story of a young lawyer who was killed in a helicopter
accident on top of the Pan American building. This young man, the father of
four children, earned approximately $160,000 annually at his death. The impact
of a possible $317,000 recovery limitation on his family would be, according to
Kreindler, "devastating." 1977 Senate Hearings on Aviation Protocols, supra
note 90, at 94.
131 By comparison, the sufficiency of recovery in non-Warsaw claims, which
can be classified as domestic, should not be used in the same context as sufficiency
of recovery would be labeled under the Warsaw Convention. Applying sufficiency
used in the domestic sense, it is used to describe the full recovery of proven
damages by the claimant, whereas, under the Warsaw Convention, sufficiency
means that the number of individuals receiving insufficient recoveries is within the
established operational level set by the government. See Comment, Revised Warsaw
Convention and Other Aviation Disasters, 8 CUM. L. REv. 764, 855 (1978).
131 See notes 88-89 supra, and accompanying text.
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the United States determined that the standard articulated through
the SCP would be adequate to satisfy most of the claims arising
from aviation accidents. President Ford, therefore, transmitted
Montreal Protocol Nos. 3 and 4 on January 14, 1977, to the
United States Senate for its advice and consent. Thereafter, on
July 20, 1977, the Civil Aeronautics Board approved an agreement
among the carriers serving the boundaries of the United States
establishing the SCP under the Prudential Insurance Company.3 '
Unfortunately for the international aviation community, however,
ratification of the Montreal Protocol appears to remain at a stand-
still in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
CONCLUSION
Tracing the stages from the original inception of the Warsaw
Convention in 1929 through the Montreal interim Agreement
signed in 1966, this comment has analyzed the progress made in
revising international air carriers' liability limits under the Warsaw
Convention and the Hague Protocol. It is a basic premise of tort
law that it is in the government's best interest to protect each and
every citizen from any unreasonable loss. For a period of almost
fourteen years, international air travelers have been affected by
court decisions that adhere to the outdated liability measures of
the Warsaw Convention and, at the same time, try to adequately
protect the traveling public. " Nowhere in today's modem deci-
sions do the courts attempt to address the proposed extension of
liability limitations. These decisions are a maze of outdated rea-
soning preventing the passenger from being sufficiently compen-
sated. Although the Convention recovery limitations have been
steadfastly upheld, ' the weakness of the Warsaw Convention is that
it does not provide a uniform, clear, and manageable system within
which all nations can work fairly and economically. Whether the
courts will move beyond their traditional parameters and allow a
jury unlimited discretion to decide on a just compensation has
not been seen. Two of the most recent and most devastating air
133 CAB, APPLICATION OF CERTAIN CERTIFIED U.S. AND FOREIGN AIR CAR-
RIERS AND THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA TO ESTABLISH A
SUPPLEMENTAL COMPENSATION PLAN, CAB Order No. 77-7-85 (July 20, 1977).
" See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977).
13Id.
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disasters"' have, to this date, failed to test the substantive contents
of liability under today's treaties and agreements.'37 The member
nations have initiated new ideas to adequately compensate the pas-
senger for injuries or death sustained while traveling internation-
ally. Nevertheless, as the Montreal interim Agreement has proven
to be outdated, it is equally fair to say that the pending Montreal
Protocol No. 3 could also quickly become outdated. As a result,
actual protection in terms of compensation will again be eminently
unsatisfactory.
The inequities of these subsequent liability limitation revisions
are evident. It is difficult to comprehend sufficiency of compensa-
tion to the passenger on the one hand and, a limitation on that
sufficiency on the other. Sufficiency of compensation must be
measured on a subjective basis by inviting the courts to determine
a reasonable recovery limit based upon the facts of each case,
whether the SCP system or any other is implemented. In essence,
the limit on liability is still alive, but now the courts will determine
its applicability and free the international community to focus
more on setting a coextensive and uniform policy.
The main objectives and purpose of the Warsaw Convention
and its subsequent amendments are to set uniform standards amen-
able to all the international carriers included. It is evident that
for such a goal to be attained, every interest cannot be fully
satisfied. Even so, the member nations can come to a basic agree-
ment, and still permit each country to supplement the set limit
separately and distinctly from the treaty obligation. In the mean-
time, international travelers continue to be bound by the $75,000
limit set in Montreal in 1965 even though the member nations
have agreed in principle to a base liability limit $42,000 above
the Montreal level.
Although some government officials involved in the treaty re-
" One of the disasters referred to involved a Turkish Airlines DC-10 which
crashed shortly after takeoff on March 3, 1974, in Paris, causing the death of
all 333 passengers on board. Three years later, on March 27, a Pan American
Airways 747 and a KLM 747 collided on the runway at Tenerife in the Canary
Islands killing almost 600 passengers and crew. See notes 1-4 supra.
' Although the context of the Warsaw Convention was not in issue, the
first Tenerife damage trial was held in the Southern District of New York with
the jury returning a verdict of $375,000. Johnson v. Pan Am. World Airways,
No. 78-CV-0086 (S.D.N.Y., filed 1977).
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visions consider these changes to be the best obtainable to achieve
international cooperation and uniformity, one official recently
concluded:
Continued failure on our part to ratify the protocols could lead
to a costly and complicated liability scheme for civil aviation,
disrupt the international aviation community, and seriously dam-
age the credibility of the United States negotiators who labored
long and hard to obtain these forward-looking changes in the
Warsaw Convention. (emphasis added)...
A constructive step has been taken towards uniformly setting
policy in international aviation liability law. The basic premise
of full compensation for loss, however, has and will continue to
disrupt any limitation on liability.
"I Address by James R. Atwood, supra note 47, at 12. On December 3,
1979, suit was commenced in the United States District Court in the Central
District of California to recover for personal injuries and loss of corporate
profits. Rideout v. Pan Am and KLM, No. 78-CV-1 130 RJW, MDL Docket No.
306. This was one of the very few cases to be tried as a result of the Tenerife
disaster on March 27, 1977. The court denied the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment four times on the issue of lost profits to a corporation from an
injury to its key employee by finding that there was a triable issue of fact that
should be decided by the jury. The decision by the district court to allow the
corporate claim to come before the jury should be read in light of the fact
that aviation litigation is becoming more complex and expanding to wider degrees
of liability. In addition to the court allowing for lost earnings and personal
property, it is now recognized in California that a corporation can recover lost
profits resulting from the injury of its key employee. With California law per-
mitting recovery by the corporation and more and more businessmen traveling
the airways each day, the aviation industry should be aware that businesses
whose key employees are injured, causing the business to suffer economic harm,
will be able to sustain an action for the amount of their loss of business.
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